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COMMENTS
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION REMITTING PENAL-
TIES ON DELINQUENT TAXES
In February 1937 the Whittemore Act' was passed. It provided
in substance that upon payment of back taxes in full, or upon an under-
taking to pay back taxes in ten equal annual installments, both of these
elections to be made before a certain date, that back penalties and interest
were to be remitted.
Later in 1937 after the Whittemore Act had gone into effect, an
act was passed amending Ohio General Code 2590-I to read as follows:
"Vhenever any penalty, interest or other charge for non-payment when
due of any real estate tax and/or assessment is paid by any person, firm
or corporation charged with or legally authorized to pay same, which
said penalty, interest or other charge after such payment is or has been
remitted or abrogated, conditionally or otherwise, any such penalty,
interest or other charge paid since the 2oth day of June, 193o and prior
to Jan. *st, 1937, is hereby expressly remitted or abrogated, on applica-
tion to the county auditor by such person, firm or corporation on or
before the first day of January, 1940, such penalty, interest and charges
so paid shall be refunded to such person, firm or corporation on the
order of the county auditor directed to the county treasurer."
The probable reason for passing Section 2590-I was the fear that
the Whittemore Act, standing alone was unconstitutional. In 1937,
the case of State ex rel. v. Hunt2 was decided by the Ohio Supreme
Court. Here the Intangible tax act gave the Tax Commission of Ohio
power to issue a certificate of immunity from collection of omitted taxes
for the years 1926 to 1930 inclusive, upon condition that the taxpayer
fully comply with the personal property tax law in 1932. This law
was held to be unconstitutional on the ground that it conferred special
benefits upon delinquent taxpayers, which is prohibited by Sec. 2, Art. I,
of the Ohio constitution. This case is in accord with the majority rule
which is stated in 99 A.L.R. IO68 as follows, "In the majority of
jurisdictions in which the question has been raised, it seems that the
remission, release, or compromise of a valid claim for taxes, authorized
by the legislature, violates some constitutional provision."'  In the
1 Pages Ohio Cumulative Code Service Number z2; 1937, p. 366, appendix F, sub-
section 4; amended subtitute Senate Bill No. 87 .
1 32 Ohio St. 568, 24 Abs. 350 (1937).
Wilson v. Suttcr County, 47 Cal. 91 (1873); New Orleans v. Lafayette Insc. Co.,
z8 La. Ann. 756 (1876)i Louisiana Cotton Mfg. Co. v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 440
(1S79). Thompson v. Auditor Gen., z61 Mich. 624, 247 N.W. 360 (1933). Falls Ship
Coal Co. v. Auditor Gen., 7 Mich. 84 (x859). Life Association of America v. Board of
Assessors, 49 Mo. 512 (1872); State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 75 Mo. 208 (i88x);
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Whittemore Act, however, it is penalties on delinquent taxes rather than
the taxes themselves that are sought to be remitted. Some courts hold
such statutes constitutional4 while others say such statutes are uncon-
stitutional.5
It would seem that Ohio could go either way on this proposition.
It is largely a matter of balancing the policy of allowing the state to do
what it thinks will be most effective in collecting delinquent taxes, as
against that of being fair to delinquent taxpayers who have already paid
the penalties. The legislature thought that by passing Section 2590-I,
the latter objection would be removed.
However, if the Whittemore Act was unconstitutional when it was
passed, could it be validated by a later statute? Several theories have
been advanced as to the effect of an unconstitutional statute. One
theory is that such a statute is void ab initio. A typical statement is that
of Justice Field in Norton v. Shelby County :6 "An unconstitutional Act
is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as though
it had never been passed." This theory seems to be the traditional theory
of the American courts.'
In the instant case if this view was taken and the Whittemore act
was unconstitutional when passed, it would be void and the fact that
Section 2590-I was later passed would be of no effect.
On the other hand, if Section 259o-i had been an amending act,
and as such showed an intent to reaffirm the Whittemore act as of the
Tubbs v. Tioga Co., 16 Pa. Dist App. 318, 32 Pa. Co. Ct. 504 (zgo6). Files v. State,
48 Ark. 529, 3 S.W. 817 (1886); In re Stanford, iz6 Cal. 2iz, 58 Pac. 462, 45 L.R.A.
788 (1889). Ranger Realty Co. v. Miller, ioz Fla. 378, 136 So. £46 (1931)i State ex
rel. Maxwell Hunter v. O'Quinn, 114 Fla. zz2, 154 So. x66 (934). Dubuque v. Illinois
C. R. Co., 39 Iowa 56 (874)i Louisville v. Louisville R. Co., iii Ky. 1, 63 S.W. 14,
98 Am. St. Rep. 387 (i9o); State ex rel. Matterson v. Luecke, 194 Minn. 246, 26o
N.W. 2o6, 99 A.L.R. 1053 (1935). Graham Paper Co. v. Gehner, 332 Mo. I£5, 59
S.W. (zd) 48 (1933)i Sanderson v. Bateman, 78 Mont. z35, 253 Pac. 1oo (x9z7).
State v. Pioneer Oil & Ref. Co, 29z S.W. 869 (Tex. 1927). Nathan v. Spokane County,
35 Wash. z6, 76 P. 5zi, 65 L.R.A. 336, 1o2 Am. St. R. 888 (19o4); State ex eel. Jones
v. Graham, 17 Neb. 43, zz N.W. 114 (1885); Lancaster County v. Trimble, 33 Neb.
121, 49 N.W. 938 (1891).
Cases contra-Mobile & C. R. Co. v. Peebles, 47 Ala. 317 (1872); Ill. C. R. Co. v.
McLean County, 17 Ill. Z91 (i85S); Hansaker v. Wright, 30 IMl. 146 (1863); McDon-
ough County v. Campbell, 42 Ill. 490 (867); Apokaa Sugar Co. v. Wilder, 21 Hawaii
571 (913; State v. State Inv. Co., 30 N.M. 491, 239 P- 741 (19z); Demoville v.
Davidson County, 87 Tenn. Z14, 10 S.W. 353 (1889); Garrott v. Buckner, 5 Ky. L.
Rep. 56 (1883).
'Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 45 S.W. (2d) 130, 79 A.L.R. 983 (1931)i
Beecher v. The Board of Supervision of Webster County, 50 Iowa 538 (1879); Livesay
v. DeArmond, 131 Ore. 563, z84 Pac. 166, 68 A.L.R. (1930); State v. Coos County,
iss Ore. 300, Z37 Pac. 678 (19z).
9 Sanderson v. Bateman, 78 Mon. 235, 253 Pac. 1100 (927); State V. Cal. M. Co.,
xg Nev. 234 (i88o); State v. Con V. M. Co., 16 Nev. 432 (188z).
o 1z8 U.S. 42S (1886), 30 L.Ed. 178, 6 S.Ct. 11z.
7Field, "The Effect of An Unconstitutional Statute," p. 2.
date of the amending act, then the two acts could be read together as if
both had been passed at the same time.
Section 2590-I cannot be said to be an express amendment because
of Sec. 16, Art. II of the Ohio Constitution, which provides, " * * *
and no law shall be revived, or amended unless the new act contains
the entire act revived, or the section or sections amended * * * "
Section 259o-I does not mention the Whittemore act, much less re-
enacting it verbatim.
It might be argued that the Whittemore act was revived by implica-
tion. The theory would be that Section 259o-i although it does not
refer to the Whittemore act was passed with the intent of making the
Whittemore act constituional. However, no auhority can be found that
holds an unconstitutional act can be amended or revived without any
reference to such act. In view of this, the above position seems untenable.
Therefore, if the Whittemore act was invalid when passed, and the
void ab initio theory is applied, it will remain unconstitutional in spite of
the passage of Section 2590-I.
Another theory as to the effect of an unconstitutional statute, is that
such statutes are neither wholly valid or wholly invalid. The courts
start with the notion that the judicial function is that of deciding specific
controversies between contestants. They do not declare a law unconsti-
tutional and void, but merely refuse to enforce it in the specific case
at hand.'
If the passage of Section 2590-I be regarded as changing the fact
situation, it is possible to argue under the above theory that the Whitte-
more act, after the passage of Section 2590-I, was constitutional. How-
ever it is very doubtful that a statute would be regarded as a fact within
the meaning of the above concept.
If either of these concepts could be applied here, it is believed that
the one to be chosen should be the one which will achieve the most desir-
able result in the situation. Here, the constitutional objection has been
removed, and the delinquent taxpayers who have already paid the penal-
ties can recover them. To apply the void ab initio doctrine would be
unreasonable in this situation, and it seems that the more realistic
approach would be to apply the other concept.
Is Section 2590-I unconstitutional because it is retroactive?
TWellingeton ct al Petitioners, I6 Pick. 87 (Mass., 1834). Dahnke-Walker v. Bon-
durant, 257 U.S. 28z 66 L.Ed. z39, 4Z S.Ct. xo6, (igzi); Yazoo & Miss. R. R. Co. v.
Jackson Vinegar Co., zz6 U.S. Z17, 57 L.Ed. 120, 33 SCt. 40 (1912). Jeffrey Mfg. Co.
V. larg, 735 U.S. 571, 59 L.Ed. 364, 35 S.Ct. x67 (1914); Rutten v. Paterson, 73 N.J.L.
467 (x9o6); Harlee - Presslcy v. Ward, iS Rich (S.C.) 231 (1868); State v. Bevins,
z3o N.W. 865, zio Ia. 1031 (1936). Shepherd v. City of Wheeling, 4 S.E. 635, 30
W.Va. 479 (1887).
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Sec. 28, Art. II of the Ohio Constitution provides, "The General
Assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing
the obligation of contracts; but may by general laws authorize courts to
carry into effect, upon such terms as may be just and equitable, the
manifest intention of parties, and officers by curing omissions, defects
and errors, in instruments and proceedings, arising out of their want of
conformity with the laws of this State."
Justice Story defined retrospective legislation as follows, "Upon
principle, every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights, ac-
quired under existing law, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past, must be deemed retrospective."
There was and is a feeling that such laws, giving an effect to a man's
acts which he could not possible foresee, and therefore make allowance
for, were unfair. This feeling no doubt prompted the adoption of this
section of the Ohio constitution. However the feeling against the unjust-
ness of this type of legislation has no very strong basis when carefully
analyzed. All judicial decisions changing or making law operate retro-
spectively and yet there is no such feeling against the unjustness of
judicial decisions on this ground. Alsb, although theoretically people
act with full knowledge of the legal consequences, yet obviously as a
practical matter this is not true.
How have the courts interpreted this section of the Ohio constitu-
tion? In spite of the broad and all inclusive language of the provision
the courts have read in certain exceptions. The constitution itself pro-
vides for an exception in the case of curative acts, and this exception is
generally accepted by the courts.' However, the courts have said this
provision does not include remedial legislation. Another exception recog-
nized by the courts, is that of retroactive legislation which recognizes
a moral obligation.
What have the courts meant by remedial legislation? It seems that
what the courts have in mind are purely procedural statutes." There
is a feeling that a man is not harmed by changing the means to be used
in enforcing his substantive rights, so long as the means are not entirely
' Goshorn v. Purcell, ii Ohio St. 64X (x86o). Burgett v. Norris, Treasurer, z5
Ohio St. 309 (1874). Miller & Swan v. Graham & Smith, 17 Ohio St. x (i866).
'0 Railroad v. Commrs.-, 31 Ohio St. 338 (1877); Railroad v. Com'rs., 35 Ohio St.
1 (1878)i Seeley v. Thomas, 31 Ohio St. 301 (1877); Peters v. McWilliams, 36 Ohio
St. iSS (x88o); Westerman v. Westerman, z5 Ohio St. Soo (x874)i John v. Bridgman,
Z7 Ohio St. 22 (i875)i Trustees of Greene Twp. v. Campbell, 16 Ohio St. i1 (1864).
State ex rel. Anderson v. Harris, 17 Ohio St. 6o8 (1867)i Temileton v. Kraner, z9
Ohio St. 554 (1874); Rairden v. Holden Adm'r., 15 Ohio St. 207 (1864); Gager v.
Prout, 48 Ohio St. 89 (i8gi); Sturges v. Carster, 114 TJ.S. 511, 5 S.Ct. 1014, z9 L.Ed.
240 (1884).
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taken away. Of course, as was pointed out by Justice Holmes, a legal
right must be legally enforceable, or it is not a legal right, but a moral
right."'
In some situations the courts feel that even changing procedure
retroactively is unfair, and places too great a burden on the party seeking
to enforce the substantive right. In such a situation the court will say
the statute is not within the exception, and hold it unconstitutional. 2
Obviously section 259o-I does not fall under this exception, as it creates
a new substantive right.
The last exception is that of a moral obligation which the legislature
may recognize by retroactive legislation. What is meant by this excep-
tion? Statutes passed for the following purposes have been held to fall
within the exception: To pay bonds issued under an unconstitutional
statute,13 to reimburse a man for collecting taxes where the county was
legally unable to do so," 4 state made liable for money paid out by the
counties to collect taxes,"5 act for refunding assessments,' 6 to reimburse
an individual for an injury inflicted by the state,' bounties to be given
to veteran soldiers who had received none,s statute exonerating public
officers for money lost without fault,' 0 sureties released from liability for
school funds, 20 adopting city ordinance void when passed,2" refunding
money paid, and property charged under an improper assessment. 22
On the other hand, the following statutes were held not to fall
within the exception and were therefore unconstitutional: Act refund-
ing taxes erroneously paid,23 act for refunding of liquor taxes, in case of
forced discontinuance,-' act to pay off bonds issued under an unconstitu-
tional statute, 2' act to pay unfounded claim,2 ' act authorizing one school
district to reimburse another for certain taxes.2 7
'x Holme, , "Collected Legal Papers 19zi," at Page 168.
'Hill v. Railusay, Zo O.C.C. (N.S.) 236, 31 C.D. z8z (x9lz). Gompf v. Wol-
finger, 67 Ohio St. 144, 65 N.E. 878 (I9OZ). Cincinnati v. Bachman, Si Ohio App. ioS
i9 Ohio Abs. 389 (I9-1)- New York Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Com'rs., 99 Fed. 846
(I9oO). State v. Tin .; Japan Co., 66 Ohio St. 18z, 64 N.E. 68 (19oz). Magruder v.Esmay, 35 Ohio St. 221 (878).
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Com'rs., io6 Fed. IZ3 (901).
"State ex rel. v. Gibson, Treasurer, z O.N.R. (N.S.) Z21, 15 O.D. 73 (1904).
"State ex rel. v. Cappeller, 39 Ohio St. 207 (1883).
'a Warder vYCom'rs., 38 Ohio St. 639 (1883).
1 7 Spitzig v. State cx rel. Hile, 19 Ohio St. 117, x6z N.E. 394 (1928)-
" State ex rel. Bates v. Richland Twp., 20 Ohio St. 36z (1870).
' Board of Education v. McLandsborough, 36 Ohio St. 227 (188o).
" State v. Board of Education, 38 Ohio St. 3 (1SSZ).
-' Kumler v. Silsbee, 38 Ohio St. 445.
"'State ex rel. v. Hoffman, 35 Ohio St. 435 (1880).
Z Comrs. v. Rosche Bros., 50 Ohio St. 103, 33 N.E. 408 (1893).
z' Application of James Boyle, etc., 14 O.N.P. (N.S.) z57, 23 O.D. 365 (1913).
' N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Com'rs., 99 Fed. 846 (9oo).
-e Board of Education v. State, Si Ohio St. 531, 38 N.E. 614 (1894).
z State ex rel. Board of Education of Macedonia v. Board of Education of Norht-
field Tap., 2z O.C.C. 24, 1z C.D. 423 (xgo).
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As will be seen from the foregoing cases the meaning of this excep-
tion is very vague. In effect it is little more than a rationalization to be
used in cases where the judges have already reached a conclusion as a
result of intuitive feelings of what is just.
To recapitulate: The Ohio constitution forbids retroactive legisla-
tion with the exception of curative statutes, yet the courts have purported
to read into this broad prohibition two exceptions, remedial legislation,
and that recognizing a moral obligation.
-By remedial legislation the courts apparently have in mind the
machinery of enforcing substantive rights. This exception is not followed
consistently, however, and in cases where retroactive remedial legislation
is felt by the court to put too heavy a burden upon one of the parties, the
court will say such legislation is retroactive and unconstitutional.
The second exception of a moral obligation is very nebulous and
seems to be used largely to justify not holding retroactive legislation
unconstitutional because the law accomplishes what seems to the court
to be a desirable end.
Looking at the field as a whole, it would seem to be safe to say, that
outside of curative statutes there are no definite exceptions, but that the
courts in many instances will hold retroactive statutes constitutional,
and rationalize by saying they fall under the exceptions to the general
rule. These exceptions when carefully analyzed will be found to mean
nothing more than that the court felt the particular statute to be just
and desirable under the circumstances.
There is probably some basis for this feeling against retroactive
legislation, though when the cases are carefully examined, and this
prejudice is tested in concrete fact situations it is discovered to be un-
founded in many situations. Frequently such legislation does achieve
desirable and just results. The courts -when confronted with this situa-
tion usually hold such legislation valid and rationalize upon the above
mentioned grounds. It is here that the courts run into difficulties. This
is particularly so in a state such as Ohio where there is a specific consti-
tutional provision against retroactive legislation. It is not the fact that
they hold such retroactive legislation valid that is objected to, but that
their purported reasons are not the real reasons for holding it valid.
These apparently definite legal standards may serve to satisfy the judges
that they are deciding the cases on the basis of legal rules and logic, and
thus not deciding upon the wisdom of the legislation. Yet they are of no
use for predicting what the courts are going to do in the future. It
would seem to be more helpful if the judges would recognize that the
standards they purport to lay down are meaningless, and that these
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standards are not used to decide cases. Due to this the present state
of the law in the field of retroactive legislation is one of confusion. If
the courts would concede that they are not deciding cases upon the
grounds they purport to in their decisions, it would clear away much of
the uncertainty and confusion. It is submitted that most of this feeling
on the part of judges that they must lay down these illusory standards
is due to the basic concept in our jurisprudence that judges do not decide
upon the policy or desirability of legislation, but merely apply the exist-
ing law. They merely see whether the statute is legally consistent with
the constitution, and do not allow their personal feelings as to the
desirability of such legislation to enter into the question. Of course, this
is not true in many situations.
It would seem to be desirable if the courts in this situation would
give their real reasons for holding the law constitutional or unconstitu-
tional rather than clinging to this elaborate system of make believe.
In the case under consideration the legislature provided a system of
penalties to make certain that taxes would be promptly paid. As they saw
the situation at the time such legislation was passed it seemed to be the
best way to enforce the regular and punctual payment of taxes. They
did not foresee the depression, and if they did they probably would not
have foreseen its effect. However the depression did come and many
people were unable to pay their taxes, and so the incentive of penalties
for delinquency did not have the anticipated result.
In order to remedy this situation, and get past due taxes in, the
legislature provided in the Whittemore Act for the remittance of pen-
alties if people would pay their delinquent taxes or agree to pay them
in ten annual installments.
Section 2590-I was passed to obviate what the legislature felt was
a possible constitutional weakness in the Whittemore Act. However as
we have seen, it may or may not have been necessary constitutionally,
and if necessary it probably does not remedy the defect.
However, merely standing by itself it would seem a just measure,
but against this feeling must be balanced the effect this act will have
upon the treasuries of the counties, etc. If the effect will be too dis-
astrous, it probably would be better to hold the act unconstitutional.
It might be objected that this act denies equal protection because it
discriminates against those who have paid their penalties before 1930.
However it seems that the court could take judicial notice of the fact
that the period of 1930 to 1936 was one of financial stress and in view
of these facts, it seems that this period of time was a reasonable basis of
classification.
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